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Executive Summary 
Germany’s pioneering role in the field of renewable energies (RES) can best be ob-
served by its world leading position in installed wind power and photovoltaics. Also its 
first European rank in the production of biofuels and installed solar thermal collector 
space is remarkable. 
These successes are not due to an exceptionally good natural resource base; mainly they 
are the result of an innovative national support policy. Pressure from the European and 
international commitments also have contributed to the German success story in RES.  
The current paper analyses the main factors of the German case in the development of 
RES, including the design elements of the national promotion instruments and support 
programmes, the policy impacts from the European and the international level, technical 
as well as cognitive conditions. In addition, a description is given of further driving 
forces for a successful RES development in other European countries.  
The paper ends with the question which of the described success factors of the German 
RES case might be transferable to China - and which not.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the mid 1970s, German policy makers both at national and regional level have 
been increasingly active in adopting several renewable energy policies. Whereas the 
period between 1974 and 1988/89 almost exclusively comprised research and demon-
stration measures, the time since the end of the 1980s until the latest, important RES 
policy regulation in summer 2004, was clearly marked by major market creation and 
stimulation measures. Their effectiveness – together with other driving forces - tells its 
own story: World leader in total installed wind power capacity in 2005, with 31 percent 
of global capacity (GWEC 2006) as well as in newly installed photovoltaic (PV) capac-
ity in 2004 and 2005, ranking first together with Japan in the cumulative installed PV 
power capacity. But will the German success in RES policy continue? Is it a special 
case? Could it be transferred to a China? If so, which lessons could China draw from 
the German case for its future RES policy approach? 
 
To answer these questions, this paper at first gives an overview of the German energy 
paths and energy balance as well as on the driving forces of the German success in the 
promotion and development of RES. This includes the design of the main RES promo-
tion instrument, the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), the 100,000 Roofs-PV-
Programme, and the Market Incentive Programme (MAP) for the creation of the RES 
market.  
 
Furthermore, the influence of the European and international level on the German RES 
governance approach, through the respective EU Directives as well as the Kyoto Proto-
col, will be analysed. In addition, technical driving forces like the necessity to modern-
ise the German energy generation system as well as cognitive success conditions are 
being described.  
By the same token, the main barriers for a further expansion of RES in Germany, like 
the limited grid capacity or the strong influence of the coal industry will also be dis-
cussed. After analysing the German case, a short look is given on the driving forces for 
a successful RES development in other European (EU) countries. 
 
In the last part of the paper the question is asked which of the described success factors 
of the German RES case might easily be transferable to the China - and which not. 
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2. Germany’s energy paths and energy balance 
In fossil fuel reserves, Germany possesses considerable hard and brown coal resources. 
The proven reserves at the end of 2004 amounted to 64 billion tonnes (Gt), correspond-
ing to 6.7 percent of the global reserves and an estimated reserves/production (R/P) ra-
tio for Germany of 305 years (Euracoal 2005: 36; BP 2005: 30). In the EU-25, Germany 
is the second largest coal producer behind Poland and the world’s leader for lignite pro-
duction. Besides, the German hard coal-mining industry since decades receives exten-
sive subsidies, amounting to 23 billion Euro for the period between 1998 and 2005 
(Reiche: 2004). According to an agreement between the German government and the 
German hard coal-mining industry these subsidies will continue at least until 2012, even 
on a declining scale, amounting to (another) 7.3 billion Euro for the period between 
2006 and 2008 (WEC 2005a: 65). However, the exploitation of German coal has been 
declining for years. 
 
Germany also has small reserves of oil (2004: 31 Mt) and natural gas (2004: 201 Gm3) 
with an estimated R/P ratio of 14 years in the case of oil (NLfB 2005: 3 et sqq.) and 12 
years in the case of natural gas. 
 
In contrast to the latter, Germany has a big RES potential as shown by many studies, 
although these studies differ in their conclusions, depending on assumptions about the 
availability of suitable sites, technical characteristics of the RES technologies and other 
factors. The figures presented in Table 1 originate from one of the most recent and ex-
tensive RES potential assessments in Germany undertaken by the Federal Environment 
Agency (UBA). 
 
Table 1 also presents figures from the final report of the Enquete-Commission of the 
German Bundestag on a sustainable energy supply (Deutscher Bundestag: 2002). Based 
on these studies, the technical potential of RES in Germany can be estimated between 
6,000 and 21,000 PJ/yr. Compared with the German primary energy consumption in 
2005 of 14,238 PJ (BMU 2006a: 4), this shows that more than 40 percent of the German 
energy demand could be covered by RES. With a higher utilisation of geothermal en-
ergy and/or greater efforts in energy saving and in energy efficiency, even the whole 
German energy supply could in principle be met by RES. 
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Table 1: Technically available potential of RES in electricity and heat generation for 
 Germany (Deutscher Bundestag: 2002; UBA 2002) 
RES potential assessment by En-
quete-Commission (PJ/a) 
RES potential assessment 
by UBA (PJ/a)* 
RES Technology 
Electricity thermal electricity thermal 
Biomass 140.4-205.2 428.4-694.8 212.4 597.6 
Photovoltaics 751 - 302.4 - 
Solar thermal - 2,112 - 1,540.8 
Hydro power 119 - 90 - 
Wind power (onshore) 299-457 - 298.8 - 
Wind power (offshore) 468-853 - 306 - 
Geothermal energy 1,620-15,950 (electricity & thermal) 237.6 2520 
Total  5,937.8-21,142 6,105.6 
* The original data in the UBA potential assessment is given in TWh/a. For a better comparabil-
ity, we converted it in PJ/a.    
 
To cover its energy demand, Germany so far strongly relies on energy imports. In 2004 
the share of energy imports in the primary energy consumption amounted to 61 percent, 
quite above EU average of 48 percent (WEC 2005a: 49 et sqq.). The most important 
energy supplier for Germany is the Russian Federation. Natural gas, oil and hard coal 
from Russia amounted to 21 percent of the whole German energy supply in 2004, re-
spectively to 35 percent of the whole energy imports. Further important suppliers of 
energy raw materials for Germany are Norway, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
Libya (WEC 2005a: 56 et sq). 
 
With regard to the structure of German primary energy consumption in 2005, Table 2 
reveals that mineral oil by far remained the most important source of energy, followed 
by coal and natural gas (with nearly the same percentages) and somewhat further behind 
by nuclear energy. Renewable energy sources - even with a growing tendency - only 
contributed to 4.6 percent (composed of 2.0 percent electricity, 2.1 percent heat and 0.5 
percent fuel) (BMU 2006: 4). In the case of gross electricity consumption in 2005 (see 
also Table 2), the share of coal accounted for 48.5 percent of the whole production, with 
23.1 percent from hard coal and 25.4 from brown coal. In 2005, nuclear energy had a 
share of 27.4 percent of electricity consumption in Germany. The contribution of RES 
to Germany’s net electricity generation in 2005 reached 10.2 percent (with wind power 
as the most important source amounting to 4.3 percent) (BMU 2006a: 4; AGEB 2006). 
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Table 2: Actual primary energy consumption and gross electricity consumption in  
Germany, 2005 (AGEB 2006; BMU 2006a: 4) 
Primary energy consumption Gross electricity consumption Energy 
source percent percent 
Mineral oil 36.0 1.6 
Natural gas 22.7 10.1 
Hard coal 12.9 23.1 
Brown coal 11.2 25.4 
Nuclear  
energy 
12.5 27.4 
RES 4.6 10.2 
Others 0.1 2.2 
Total 100.0 (14,238 PJ) 100 (610.5 TWh) 
 
Table 3 shows that more than half of RES production in Germany in 2005 was based on 
biomass. Regarding heat production by RES, the share of biomass amounted to 94.3 
percent, whereas in electricity production wind energy for the first time generated more 
electricity (42.7 percent) than hydro power (34.6 percent) (BMU 2006a: 5). Compared 
with the technically available potential of RES in Germany presented in Table 1, the 
current use of RES represents a share of 2.8 percent, in relation to the most optimistic 
RES technical potential assessment, and 9.9 percent in relation to the most conservative 
one. 
 
Table 3: Structure of energy supply by renewable energy souces (RES) in Germany,  
2005 (BMU 2006a: 5) 
Energy source percent 
Biomass heat 46.7 
Biomass electricity 8.0 
Biofuels 12.6 
Hydropower 13.1 
Wind power  16.2 
Photovoltaic electricity 0.6 
Solar thermal 1.8 
Geothermal heat 1.0 
Total 100.0 (163.9 TWh) 
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3. Main factors of the German success in RES governance 
With regards to capacity growth of renewable energies during the last years, in several 
technology fields Germany is the leading nation at global, respecively European level: 
- Germany is the world leader in total installed wind power capacity, 
which amounted to 18,428 MW by the end of 2005 (31 percent of 
global capacity, GWEC 2006). 
- As to newly installed photovoltaic (PV) capacity in 2004 and 2005, 
Germany showed the strongest growth with 500, respectively 600 
MW new PV installations, reaching a totally installed capacity of 
1,400 MWp by the end of 2005 (BSW 2006) - thereby ranking first 
together with Japan in the cumulative installed PV power capacity. 
- The German market for solar heating systems is the biggest and most 
rapidly increasing one in Europe amounting to 7.2 Mio. m2 of in-
stalled solar collector space at the end of 2005, with a newly installed 
capacity during that same year of 950,000 m2 (BMU 2006a: 2). 
- Germany was the European leader in the production of biodiesel, with 
1.7 Mio. t, in 2005 (BMU 2006a: 2). 
These successes are the result of a bundle of interrelated driving forces. We identified 
the following: (1) A favourable design of RES promotion instrument, the EEG; (2) a 
comprehensive RES promotion approach with a lead market focus; (3) external pressure 
deriving from European and international commitments in RES policy and active cli-
mate protection; (4) a positive cognitive environment towards RES, as well as (5) cer-
tain technical driving forces. 
3.1 Favourable design of RES promotion instruments 
Although there is no real superiority of any promotion instrument, until now so called 
renewable energy feed-in tariffs (REFITs) have shown the best effectiveness concerning 
the creation of new RES installations. The leading wind energy countries, Germany and 
Spain, have installed successful REFIT systems and almost all old installations in Den-
mark are based on this system, too. Nearly 78 percent of all wind power capacity in the 
EU-25, accounting to 40,504 MW at the end of 2005, was installed in these three coun-
tries (EWEA 2006). 
 
What are the reasons for this impressive development? In the first place this is the plan-
ning security the three countries offered possible investors with the specific design of 
their REFITs. Germany, for example, guarantees investors the feed-in tariff for a period 
of 20 years (and even 30 years for hydro, until 5 MW). 
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Another very important design criterion for a successful RES development is the tech-
nology-specific remuneration for RES electricity, easily adjustable within a REFIT sys-
tem. If the different power production costs of the individual RES technologies are con-
sidered in the form of varying remuneration, the possibilities to reach a broad RES sup-
ply (or technology mix) seem higher than with a uniform remuneration level. The Ger-
man Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) established such a broad promotion ap-
proach with remuneration rates depending on the technology used, the size of the plant, 
and in the case of wind energy in addition also depending on the age and the generated 
power output of the installation (Reiche/Bechberger 2006: 206 et seq.). 
 
Germany has a long tradition in promoting green electricity with feed-in tariffs. Already 
in 1991 the Act on Supplying Electricity from Renewables (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, 
StrEG) entered into force which introduced for the first time feed-in tariffs for RES 
electricity. An amended version followed in 1998. 
 
On April 1, 2000, the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 
EEG) came into force, carrying forward the approach of its predecessor, the StrEG of 
1991, in an extended and improved manner. The design of the former StrEG included 
several points that harmed the development of RES. This made necessary a determined 
and quick change. The most important structural elements of the new EEG can be 
summarised as follows: Firstly, the remuneration system was uncoupled from the aver-
age utility revenue per kWh sold and replaced by fixed, degressive and temporarily lim-
ited feed-in tariffs for the whole amount of generated RES electricity. Secondly, a prior-
ity purchase obligation for RES power was introduced, to be fulfilled by the nearest grid 
operator. Thirdly, a German-wide equalisation scheme was adopted for the costs which 
grid operators incur as a result of the different amounts of RES each region feeds into 
the power grid; this leads to an evenly distribution of the RES power amounts and ex-
tends remuneration to all energy supply companies - and ultimately to all end consum-
ers. Fourth, the EEG also contained provisions concerning the financing of grid connec-
tion and grid extension (Bechberger/Reiche 2004). 
 
The first amendment of the EEG was the extension of its ambit: Besides the energy 
sources already considered in the StrEG, the EEG also included electricity from geo-
thermal energy and pit gas. The power limit for hydro plants and installations using 
sewage or landfill gas of 5 MW fixed in the StrEG now also concerns installations 
based on pit gas or solar energy. In contrast, the power limit for biomass plants was 
raised from 5 to 20 MW. 
 
The most far-reaching changes in comparison to the StrEG are related to the remunera-
tion scheme. The EEG raised all remuneration rates, although in different scale, depend-
ing on the source of energy, capacity or location of the plant. Except for hydro power, 
where the amortisation of the power plants normally takes several decades, the EEG 
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fixed the purchase guarantee and the feed-in tariffs for 20 years after putting into opera-
tion of every new plant. 
 
To stimulate innovations and to ensure a better compatibility with the European law on 
state aid, the remuneration paid under the EEG also included a digressive element: 
From 2002 on, new installations of biomass (minus 1 percent), wind (minus 1.5 percent) 
and PV (minus 5 percent) received lower tariffs. From 2003 on, new installations of 
these types received tariffs lowered by a further 1, 1.5 or 5 percent, and so on for the 
following years. 
 
To comply with the European law, the EEG set three further provisions. Firstly, by 30 
June every two years after the entry into force of the law a report shall be submitted on 
the progress achieved in terms of the market introduction and the cost development of 
RES power generation plants. Where necessary, this report shall propose adjustments of 
the remuneration amounts and of their reduction rates, in keeping with technological 
progress and market developments with regard to new installations. 
 
Secondly, relating to the remuneration for wind power, the different quality of plant 
sites was taken into account (“Referenzertragsmodell”). The purpose of this new provi-
sion is to avoid payment of compensation rates that are higher than what is required for 
a cost-effective operation of such installations, and to create an incentive for installing 
wind energy converters at inland sites. 
 
Thirdly, the remuneration scheme for PV power contained a special provision that is 
connected with the compliance with the European law. The guaranteed remuneration 
shall not apply to PV systems commissioned after 31 December of the year following 
the year in which PV systems reach a total installed capacity of 350 megawatts. This 
limit was raised to 1,000 MW in June 2002 because the 350 MW seemed to be sur-
passed already in 2003 and the successful PV sector needed further planning security. In 
the amendment of the EEG in 2004, this capacity limit was revoked completely. 
 
Moreover, the EEG comprised a clear regulation concerning grid costs. Accordingly, 
the costs for grid connection have to be paid by the plant operators whereas possible 
costs for upgrading the grid must be borne by the grid operator. For the settlement of 
any dispute in relation to grid costs, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(BMWi) established a clearing centre, with the involvement of the parties concerned. 
 
Finally, the EEG constituted a multi-level and nation-wide equalisation scheme for RES 
electricity purchases and compensation payments. This provision was designed to rem-
edy a shortcoming in the former StrEG, as a result of which the electricity purchases to 
be made were far above average in some regions. The equalisation provision in the EEG 
is aimed at the operators of transmission grids. (This is a small group with a limited 
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number of players which will easily be able to handle the transactions associated with 
the equalisation scheme and which will also be able to monitor each other). 
 
In August 2004, an amended version of the EEG came into force. Compared with the 
previous EEG, the amendment provides for a more differentiated fee structure, taking 
into account of efficiency aspects. In particular, the payment conditions for biomass, 
biogas, geothermal as well as photovoltaic energy were improved1. If existing large 
hydropower plants are modernised or expanded (up to a capacity of 150 MW), the addi-
tional electricity generated is included in the fee. For 2006, fees under the new EEG 
range from 5.28 Euro cents/kWh for electricity from wind energy (basic payment) to 
56.80 Euro cents/kWh for solar electricity from small façade systems. The annual di-
gression in the fees for new installations was increased to strengthen the incentives for 
technical innovations and cost cutting, e.g. 2 percent for wind energy, 1.5 percent for 
bio energy and 5 percent for photovoltaic energy starting from 2005. From 2006 on-
wards, the degression for new PV installations on open spaces was even increased up to 
6.5 percent. For the first time also a degression of 1 percent for new geothermal plants 
was introduced, starting from 2010. 
 
For the area of bioenergy, in addition to the minimum fees laid down, the new version 
of the EEG provides for additional fees (bonuses), if the electricity is exclusively pro-
duced from self-regenerating raw materials, combined heat-power, or if the biomass 
was converted using innovative technologies (e.g. thermal chemical gasification, fuel 
cells, gas turbines, organic Rankine systems, Kalena cycle plants or Stirling engines). 
The bonuses can be used cumulatively. 
 
The payment rate for wind energy on land was lowered in the amendment. Wind parks 
which could not achieve at least 60 percent of the reference yield at the planned location 
can no longer claim payment under the 2004 law. For coastal sites in particular, there 
are new incentives for “repowering” (the replacement of old, smaller installations by 
modern, more efficient ones). The higher starting fees for offshore wind parks will now 
be paid for installations commissioned prior to 2011 (previously 2006). Furthermore, 
the period for the higher starting fee for offshore wind parks was prolonged to a mini-
mum of 12 years (before, 9 years). This period can also be extended for installations 
located further from the coastline and erected in deeper water. 
 
Since July 2003 there has been an equalisation regulation for electricity intensive com-
panies in the producing sector. This regulation was expanded in the amended EEG. 
Electricity intensive companies in the producing sector and environmentally friendly 
railways can be included under the equalisation regulation if their electricity consump-
                                                 
1 The increased rates for solar power compensate the expiry of the 100,000 roofs programme (see below) 
and already became effective in January 2004 by a preliminary act, the “PV-Vorschaltgesetz”. 
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tion is higher than 10 gigawatts (previously 100 gigawatts), and the ratio of electricity 
costs to gross value added exceeds 15 percent (previously 20). The amendment to the 
EEG limits the total relief volume. This again limits the extra costs incurred by non-
privileged companies due to the equalisation scheme. The electricity volumes which are 
distributed among the non-privileged electricity consumers are limited to a maximum of 
10 percent above the share calculated pursuant to the EEG (BMU 2004a).  
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Table 4: Feed-in tariffs for electricity produced from renewable energy sources in  
Germany (as of 2006) (BMU 2004b) 
Source Capacity Tariff / kWh Period/ 
years 
Comments 
Hydro-
power 
Until 5 
MW 
9.67 cEuro up to 500 kW 
6.65 cEuro over 500 kW to 5 MW 
30 Limitations for sites 
starting from 2008 
 Up to 150 
MW 
7.51 cEuro ( to 500 kW) 
6.51 cEuro (500 kW to 10 MW) 
5.98 cEuro (10 MW to 20 MW) 
4.46 cEuro (20 MW to 50 MW) 
3.62 cEuro (50 MW to 150 MW) 
15 Only when renewed 
plants and only re-
compensation of addi-
tional capacity 
Sewage 
gas,  
pit gas, 
landfill 
gas 
Unlimited 7.44 cEuro (to 500 kW) 
6.45 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
6.45 cEuro (pit gas from 5 MW) 
20 Sewage – and landfill 
gas: capacity over 5 
MW will be recom-
pensated according to 
market price 
 Unlimited 9.44 cEuro (to 500 kW) 
8.45 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
8.45 cEuro (pit gas from 5 MW) 
20 Implementation of 
specific innovative 
technologies 
Bio-
mass* 
Up to 20 
MW 
11.16 cEuro (up to 150 kW) 
9.60 cEuro (150 to 500 kW) 
8.64 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
8.15 cEuro (5 MW to 20 MW) 
20  
 Up to 20 
MW 
3.78 cEuro (up to 20 MW) 
 
20 Use of waste wood of 
categories A II and A 
IV from 01.07.2006 
 Up to 20 
MW 
17.16 cEuro (up to 150 kW) 
15.60 cEuro (150 to 500 kW) 
12.64 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
8.15 cEuro (5 MW to 20 MW) 
 
20 Only when use of 
specific substances 
such as plants origi-
nating from agricul-
tural, silvicultural, 
horticultural opera-
tions, or manure ac-
cording to (EC) No 
1774/2002, vinasse 
etc. (so called “nach-
wachsende Roh-
stoffe”) 
 Up to 20 
MW 
17.16 cEuro (up to 150 kW) 
15.60 cEuro (150 to 500 kW) 
11.14 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
8.15 cEuro (5 MW to 20 MW) 
20 Burning wood in the 
sense of sentence 1 
 12 
 Up to 20 
MW 
13.16 cEuro (up to 150 kW) 
11.60 cEuro (150 to 500 kW) 
10.64 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
10.15 cEuro (5 MW to 20 MW) 
20 Combined heat and 
power plants (gekop-
pelter Betrieb) 
 Up to 20 
MW 
15.16 cEuro (up to 150 kW) 
13.60 cEuro (150 to 500 kW) 
12.64 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
10.15 cEuro (5 MW to 20 MW) 
20 Electricity from com-
bined heat and power 
plants when innova-
tive technologies are 
implemented 
Geo-
ther-
mal 
energy 
Unlimited 15,00 cEuro (up to 5 MW) 
14,00 cEuro (5 MW to 10 MW) 
8,95 cEuro (10 MW to 20 MW) 
7.16 cEuro (over 20 MW) 
20  
Wind-
energy 
On-
shore 
 8.36 cEuro (initial tariff) 
5.28 cEuro (basic tariff) 
 
20 Depending on refer-
ence revenue**, the 
initial higher tariff is 
granted between 5 and 
20 years; no recom-
pensation for plants 
with reference reve-
nue of less than 60 
percent***. Addi-
tional incentive (pro-
longed initial higher 
tariff) for repowering 
of plants. 
Wind-
energy 
Off- 
shore 
 9.10 cEuro (initial tariff) 
6.19 cEuro basic tariff 
20 Initial higher tariff is 
granted when put into 
operation until end of 
2010. Depending on 
site 12 to 20 years. 
Additional prolonga-
tion for deeper waters 
and growing distance 
from coast. 
Photo-
voltaic 
energy 
On top of 
or on 
buildings 
or on noise 
protection 
walls 
51.80 cEuro (up to 30 kW) 
49.28 cEuro (30 to 100 kW) 
48.74 cEuro (from 100 kW) 
20  
 Plants in-
tegrated in 
buildings 
56.80 cEuro (up to 150 kW) 
54.28 cEuro (150 to 500 kW) 
53.74 cEuro (500 kW to 5 MW) 
20  
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 Plants on 
open 
spaces or 
others 
40.60 cEuro 20 Specific criteria con-
cerning site are to be 
fulfilled. 
 
* Tariffs for electricity from biomass are subject to additional bonuses on top of the basic 
tariff, see e.g. the so called “nachwachsende Rohstoffe” (renewable primary products) in 
the third section (up to additional 6 ct/kWh). Various bonuses can also be combined: in 
2006, a small plant up to 150 kW, using innovative technology, with combined heat-
power and firing renewable primary products could get a total tariff of 21.16 ct/kWh.  
**  The reference revenue is calculated on the basis of the amount of electricity feed in during 
the first 5 years.  
*** To be determined in advance. 
3.2 RES promotion approach with a lead market orientation 
The described favourite design elements of the EEG are, without doubt, the reason for a 
large part of the substantial investments in the German wind and photovoltaic market - 
and thereby for the success of the RES development in general. By the same token, 
these regulations also paved the way for the development of a “lead market” for envi-
ronmental innovations, meaning the willingness of a nation state to bear the initial risks 
(and development costs) of environmental innovations until they reached market com-
petitiveness. If such innovations could stimulate a global demand, the pioneering role of 
one nation might be recompensated with “first mover” advantages: export markets will 
be developed and economic advantages will be assured. Furthermore, this kind of pio-
neer policy won’t lead to a political isolationism but may have a demonstration effect 
which can enhance international diffusion (Jänicke 2005). 
 
An example for such a development is the German RES promotion policy which can be 
seen by the fact that Germany - despite relative unfavourable geographical/climatic 
conditions - is world leader in absolute installed wind power and photovoltaic capacity 
(the latter together with Japan). In the meantime, RES have become an important eco-
nomic factor. The magnitude of employment in the RES sector by the end of 2004 had 
reached around 157,000, with 64,000 in the wind industry, whereof 30,300 were due to 
exports (Eurobserv’ER 2006: 58). The total turnover for German renewable energy in-
dustries in 2005 amounted to approximately 16 billion €. In 2005, the role of “green 
power” in energy policy has become more significant following the pressure to adopt 
pro-active measures to combat climate change (the “Kyoto-Protocol-effect”). 
 
The success of the German RES governance approach as was already said is not only 
based on the EEG, but also on a broad policy mix. Such a complex pattern of political 
regulation (or smart regulation) is based on the finding that a success oriented policy 
should not be limited to the deployment of one single measure. Moreover, the imple-
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mentation of policies will be facilitated by negotiated targets and concrete requirements 
(Jänicke et al. 1999: 107 et sqq.). 
 
Such a strategic approach can be observed in all segments of German RES policy. 
Whereas the target for the contribution of RES-E was set to reach 12.5 percent by 2010 
and even 20 percent by 2020, biofuels should reach a market share of 5.75 percent by 
the end of 2010 (both target marks for 2010 date from respective EU-Directives, and 
were transposed into national law). 
 
For the achievement of the targets, the German RES governance approach is marked by 
a flexible instrumentation, with a mature support mechanism for the whole range of 
RES technologies. This comprises classical interventionist measures like the EEG (the 
supply companies have to purchase the RES electricity and the end customers finally 
pay it through an apportionment onto their monthly electricity bills), or promotion pro-
grammes like the Market Incentive Programme (MAP) with direct investment subsidies 
and soft loans mainly for RES heat applications – and financed through an earmarked 
part of the tax earnings of the Environmental Tax Reform, amounting to € 193 million 
in 2005 (BMU 2005c). Also market-based instruments are applied like the (partial) ex-
emption of biofuels from the mineral oil taxes. With the privilege of wind power, hydro 
and biomass installations in the German Building Code, the broad RES policy mix is 
complemented by a planning instrument. 
 
In conclusion, the German RES promotion approach tries to support all kind of renew-
able energies according to their respective needs, and not only the most economic or 
competitive technologies. The technology-specific remuneration of the EEG or addi-
tional measures like the 100,000 roofs PV programme (which expired by the end of 
June 2003 after successfully supporting the installation of 300 MWp of PV capacity) 
shall bring a comprehensive development of all RES sectors in the course of an ecologi-
cal transformation of the whole German energy system (Reiche 2005: 4 et seq.). 
3.3 European and international commitments in RES 
To fully understand the success of the German RES policy it is also necessary to take a 
look at the European and international level. At European level, the most influencing 
driver was the Directive 2001/77/EC which contained ambitious indicative targets for 
all EU Member States with regard to the increase in RES electricity to total power con-
sumption from 13.9 percent in 1997 to at least 21 percent in 2010 for the EU-25. The 
individual target for Germany was set by 12.5 percent, starting from 4.5 percent in 
1997, representing an ambitious goal as it requires to nearly triple the national RES-E 
share in a thirteen years period. 
 
Even though, according to a first assessment of the EU Commission, most of the EU 
countries are likely to miss their RES-E targets, Germany was appraised to be one of the 
 15
few EU Member States to reach its goal (European Commission 2004: 14). In its 2005 
report on achievement of the target for electricity consumption from renewable energy 
sources by 2010 the Federal Government anticipates that “… the EU´s indicative target 
for Germany will be met by 2010, whereby the EEG will act as the principal mechanism 
for this purpose” (BMU 2005b). Several predictions assume that the target will be 
reached even earlier than 2010 as the RES-E share in gross electricity consumption at 
the end of 2005 already reached 10.2 percent (see above). 
 
A further important driver for German RES policy at international level is its commit-
ment to the “Kyoto Protocol”. As Germany obliged itself to reduce its greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by 21 percent until 2008-12 as compared to 1990 emissions level, 
promoting the CO2-free or neutral renewables (i.e. via investments in RES projects on 
the basis of the Clean Development Mechanism, CDM) is one way for Germany to ful-
fil its obligations under the Climate Convention. Although Germany by the end of 2004 
already fulfilled more than 90 percent of its total reduction commitment (19.2 percent 
out of 21 percent) (DIW 2005: 14), the complete goal attainment still needs further ac-
tion. 
3.4 Cognitive success conditions 
Even though the national regulative RES approach as well as the European and interna-
tional commitments concerning RES-E promotion and active climate protection might 
be seen as main reasons for the success of RES in Germany, it is important to empha-
sise that the outcome of setting a political framework in the end very much depends 
from the people who fill them with life. Every law or regulation is only as good as its 
acceptance and compliance by the public. 
 
Nearly 2,700 biogas and more than 17,500 wind plants at the end of 2005 as well as 
175,000 newly connected solar installations in 2005 (100,000 solar thermal and 75,000 
PV, amounting to a total of 800,00 solar thermal as well 200,000 PV installations) are a 
strong evidence that the setting of a favourable political RES framework in Germany 
corresponds with an interested public (BSW 2006: 1 et sqq.; DEWI 2006; Fachverband 
Biogas 2006). The success or effectiveness of the main German RES promotion instru-
ments like the EEG and the Market Incentive Programme was therefore also much 
caused by an adequate demand within society. The 100,000-roofs PV programme 
proved so successful that the overall budget of 510 million Euro had to be distributed 
within a shorter period as originally planned to satisfy the strong demand (Reiche 
2005a: 64). 
 
The high level of acceptance of RES within the German public can also be demon-
strated by surveys on energy policy. A 2005 survey by the Forsa-Institute shows that a 
large majority holds the promotion of RES the best approach to a sustainable energy 
 16 
policy. 62 percent of the German population are in favour of an increased support of 
RES; only 4 percent plead for reduced or ceased support. With respect to preferred en-
ergy sources, the majority opts for solar energy; coal ranks last. 
 
A representative survey of the Allensbach Institute in 2005 largely confirmed these re-
sults. A 2005 survey on “Wind power plants and tourism” of the SOKO-Institute 
showed that only 24 percent would consider wind power plants in German resort areas a 
nuisance, but 75 percent would be annoyed by nuclear and coal power plants; 58 per-
cent by high-rising buildings, and 55 percent by motorways. 
 
The favourable cognitive environment with regard to RES in Germany can also be 
shown by the fact that more and more people participate in cooperative RES projects. 
Already at the end of 2002, 340,000 Germans had invested about € 12 billion in renew-
able energy projects (Sawin 2004: 25). 
3.5 Technical driving forces 
Although the electricity demand in Germany is supposed to decrease during the next 
years, due to the age structure of the power generation system as well as the decision of 
the German government to phase out nuclear energy, it will be necessary to replace 
older power plants with a power capacity of about 40 GW until 2020 (UBA 2005: 107). 
This might open a new “window of opportunity” if the decision makers instead of re-
placing the old fossil power plants mainly with new fossil based ones would opt for an 
alternative energy path, including energy efficiency and RES based energy supply. 
 
The chances for such an ecological transformation of the energy sector in Germany are 
better than one might think at first glance: a recently published study on the growth of 
RES in the German electricity sector revealed that the share of RES-E could cover al-
ready 25 percent of the gross electricity consumption by 2020 (BMU 2005d: 5); a pre-
requisite however would be a further decline of RES costs. 
 
A positive example is the cost development of wind power in Germany, where the aver-
age investment costs of a wind energy plant was reduced from 2,150 €/kW in 1990 to 
865 €/kW in 1999 (Bechberger/Reiche 2006); the “Wind Force 12” study estimated 
further cost reductions of more than 36 percent between 2003 and 2020 from - 804 
€/kW to 512 €/kW (EWEA/Greenpeace 2004: 70). According to the German Wind En-
ergy Association, the prices of wind power in Germany will be cost-competitive in 2015 
at the latest, due to economies of scale in the wind sector on the one hand, and growing 
electricity prices from conventional energy sources due to higher fuel prices and emis-
sions trading, on the other (BWE 2006: 1). 
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4. Barriers to a further expansion of RES in Germany 
Although opinion polls show a very positive attitude (and support) of renewables by the 
general public, this attitude seems to have a strong NIMBY (“Not-In-My-Back-Yard”) 
component. Especially, there are local resistance movements against wind energy pro-
jects. Reasons given are visual intrusion, noise, land devaluation, health problems due 
to radiation, negative impact on local tourism, etc. (REALISE-Forum 2005: 30). Be-
sides this, the consumers´ willingness to change to a green electricity supplier in the 
liberalised market is still limited. The main reasons for that are the allegedly higher 
prices for green power and a certain resistance to change the supplier in general (only 4 
percent of all households until the end of 2003) (Reiche 2004). 
 
An obstacle for wind energy – which is the most important renewable energy source in 
the German electricity market – is the present grid capacity. Grid expansion measures 
are needed. According to the grid study by the German Energy Agency (dena) by the 
year 2020 various grid sections covering an overall length of approximately 400 km 
will need to be reinforced and routes spanning around 850 km will need to be com-
pletely rebuilt. Furthermore, the grid needs to be extended by about 5 percent (BMU 
2005b). This however this seems to be a feasible task, as the costs per year for this 
amount of grid extension would only be 110 million Euro. By way of comparison: the 
grid operators invest 2 billion Euro every year in their whole 1.6 million km-long grid. 
(The grid charges could increase due to the expansion of the network by 2.5 hundredths 
of a cent per kWh in 2015; that is less than 1 Euro per year per household). Due to the 
expansion of wind energy, conventional power stations with an output of approximately 
2,000 MW could be replaced. That is equivalent to three large coal-fired stations. No 
additional power stations need to be built for balancing energy generation. (The addi-
tional 5.6 TWh minutes and hours reserve required per year can be supplied by the ex-
isting normal power stations). The impact on electricity prices will only amount to 6 to 
8 hundredths of a cent per kWh in 2015, which is between 2 and 3 Euro per year per 
household. According to the German Wind Energy Association the costs of the network 
expansion, balancing and reserve energy amount to about 0.1 cent/kWh in 2015 (BWE 
2005). 
 
Another obstacle for the future wind energy development may be a more restrictive 
policy of some the German States (Länder), such as for example North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW). In May 2005, Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (FDP) re-
placed the red-green government (Social Democrats, SPD, and the Green Party). One of 
the first measures of the new government was a new provision for distance and height 
limitations of wind turbines. This has reduced the potential for further onshore expan-
sion. Possibilities to replace old with more powerful new installations (“repowering”) 
are also affected by these provisions of the Länder (BMU 2005b). 
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A general barrier for further development of renewable energies in Germany is the 
availability of coal and the strong political influence of the coal sector. This resulted, for 
example, in a virulent campaign against wind power in Germany in connection with the 
amendment of the EEG of 2003 and the assurance of the then Chancellor Schröder to 
further subsidise hard coal mining industry between 2006 and 2012 with € 17 billion. 
Another problem for the future RES development in Germany is the procurement policy 
in the case of natural gas. The supply contracts with the most important providers will 
not expire before 2011 and some contracts are even fixed until 2030. Most of these have 
so called “take or pay” conditions (Reiche 2004). Although there has been a sort of 
convergence of interests between the gas and RES sectors, especially in the heat market, 
a too strong volume of gas could somehow create priority conflicts and slow down RES 
deployment in the electricity market. 
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5. Driving forces of RES development in other EU countries 
As the German RES promotion approach has shown, the effectiveness of a single pro-
motion instrument like the REFIT system depends on the specific construction of the 
tool. The main explanation for countries that use REFITs successfully is that they offer 
investors long-term security, like for example Germany with a payment guarantee 
within the EEG of 20 years, or even 30 years in the case of small hydro power (see 
above). Other countries followed the successful German approach, like Spain or Portu-
gal, which both in 2004 amended their support systems and even introduced a guarantee 
of remuneration for the whole lifetime of the RES installations. 
 
So, it is not surprising that Portugal nearly doubled its installed wind capacity within 
only one year from 522 MW in 2004 to 1,022 MW by the end of 2005. In 2004, Spain 
was even world leader in newly installed wind capacity (2,065 MW) and reached third 
place in 2005 (1,764 MW) (EWEA 2005 & 2006; GWEC 2006). 
 
The Spanish success in wind energy development, besides life long remunerations for 
RES installations, is also based on the choice between two different payment options 
within the promotion system, where RES producers can choose between a pure fixed 
feed-in tariff with a high planning security and a market-based option, where they par-
ticipate in the conventional pool system and gain a mixture of electricity pool price, 
green bonus and a special market bonus. The latter option is more risky, but also re-
wards with higher total remunerations (mainly because pool prices increased signifi-
cantly in 2005), and paves the way for a better integration of wind power into the con-
ventional power system. 
 
Another positive solution with regard to remedy local resistance movements against 
wind energy projects (the so called “NIMBY” effect, see above) was implemented in 
Greece (in 2002) and in Portugal (in 2005), where RES plant owners must pay 2 percent 
(in the case of Greece), respectively 2.5 percent (concerning Portugal) of their RES 
electricity sales to the municipalities where the particular RES project is located, 
thereby strengthening the local public acceptance of RES projects. 
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6. Transferability of the German RES case to China?2 
As the development of renewable energy sources in Germany is considered a success 
story, a lot of countries already followed the German RES promotion approach. 
Neighbouring nations like France or Czech Republic “copied” or oriented their own 
RES promotion laws at least partly on the German EEG; and even a country like Brazil 
adopted a RES promotion law which resembles the German one. In this chapter we 
briefly will analyse which of the German drivers of its successful RES promotion might 
be transferable to a country like China - with different framework conditions regarding 
economic development, political system, energy mix or demographic structure. 
 
The first main driver for Germany’s success in its RES development was the favourable 
design of the EEG with regard to an effective RES promotion. These success conditions 
seem to be achieved - at least to some extent -with the new Chinese RES promotion 
law, adopted by the National People’s Congress on February 28, 2005 that finally en-
tered into force on January 1, 2006. 
 
The major provisions are (1) a clear definition of RES (comprising wind, solar, hydro-
power, biomass, geothermal energy, oceanic energy, etc.); (2) a breakdown of the re-
sponsibilities of the different institutional levels with chief responsibility at central, state 
level; (3) a purchase obligation by the grid operators for the RES-E produced by the 
selected projects combined with certain minimum tariffs; and (4) a right to network 
access for RES-E producers with the possibility for grid operators to pass on the costs 
for grid connection in the charges for grid use (including a balancing mechanism 
amongst grid operators to equal possible extra costs of RES in one region). 
 
These outcomes seem to be the result of a close cooperation between Chinese experts 
consulting the National Peoples’ Congress and international experts, including the 
German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). But as the new Chinese RES law 
only codified the mentioned basic promotion conditions, the decisive details are to be 
specified through 12 regulations like the concrete financing mechanism based on feed-
in tariffs or the regulation of the national balancing mechanism (GTZ 2005: 5 et seq.). 
In mid January 2006, the first three regulations were published, including the specific 
tariff regulations. Therein it was decided not to implement a REFIT system for all RES-
E producers with fixed and technology-differentiated tariffs for all kind of RES-E tech-
nologies like in the German EEG, but to introduce a tendering scheme and thereby 
promoting concrete RES-E projects via the awarding of concessions (Neue Energie, 
2/2006: 79). Therewith the Chinese government continued its previous RES tariff policy 
(the tariffs in the hitherto concession projects oscillated between 2.8 and 3.8 € 
cents/kWh), although the national and international experts as well the  Chinese and 
                                                 
2 We would like to thank Matthias Corbach for his valuable aide with regard to this chapter on China. 
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foreign wind developers, operators and manufacturers almost unanimously  pleaded for 
the introduction of a REFIT scheme. So, China will follow a RES-E promotion ap-
proach which on international level is more a discontinued model due to the negative 
experiences of the UK, which in 2002 already switched to a promotion system based on 
RES quotas in combination with tradeable green certificates, or Ireland as the last EU-
25 country with a pure RES-E tendering scheme, which in 2005 decided to switch to a 
REFIT system (Reiche/Bechberger 2006: 203 et seq.).  
 
The main problem with a tendering system is that a high number of bids of potential 
project developers might be of speculative nature, with project proposals below eco-
nomic feasibility which can lead to a low level of realised projects. In the UK, after five 
calls for tender during the 1990s there was 2,236 MW of wind capacity approved, but 
by the end of 2003, when the awarded wind projects under the British tendering system 
finally had to be operative, only 649 MW of wind energy capacity was really installed. 
A further problem of the British tender scheme was that it did not create a significant 
market for manufacturers and  a relatively low competition intensity among turbine 
producers and constructors. As these are the stages of the value chain that contribute 
most to the total cost of wind energy, the lower competition at these stages led to a 
slower decrease in costs as expected (Butler/Neuhoff 2004: 5 et sqq.; Dinica 2003: 
544). 
 
Actually, the experience that a number of bids might be of speculative nature, has also 
been made in China. Some tenders have been awarded to inexperienced developers 
which have considerable problems in making the wind parks work. 
 
With this experience, it is very hard to believe, that the recently adopted RES-E promo-
tion scheme based on a tendering system will produce the 30,000 MW wind energy 
capacity which the Chinese Government foresees in 2020. 
 
Apparently, the Chinese Government has foreseen another instrument to take care of 
that, which is a quota system for the big electricity producers. This has been indicated in 
some of the regulations. As the type of quota system was not yet made transparent, it is 
difficult to discuss its implication. If it is true, that the large electricity generators will 
be obliged to have a certain share (say 5 percent) of (specifically defined) renewable 
energy technologies in their capacity portfolio, this would force them to participate in 
the bidding. If this approach becomes reality, the generators would concentrate on ca-
pacity instead of energy generation from renewables. This would be an unfortunate fea-
ture. 
 
A direct diffusion of Germany’s RES promotion experience seems more likely with 
regard to the very successful German 100,000 roofs PV programme, as the Chinese 
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Government is discussing a similar programme for the city of Shanghai (WEC 2005: 
35).  
 
The second important driving force identified for the German success in RES, a com-
prehensive RES promotion approach with a lead-market orientation, might also be 
transferable for the most part to China. Albeit the German policy mix for the promotion 
of RES is still broader as the Chinese to date, China nevertheless already applies a com-
bination of promotion measures, ranging from the tendering scheme with fixed tariffs 
for the selected projects as well as fiscal instruments like tax reductions (i.e., 50 percent 
reduction of value added tax for electricity generation from wind power since 2002), the 
granting of soft loans for local wind plant production to the raising of foreign funds for 
RES projects, like the “Renewable Energy Development Programme”, based on dona-
tions by the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), or the German 
KfW development bank (GTZ 2005: 11 et seq.).  
 
An own RES industry is already well established in the area of solar thermal applica-
tion, and on a lower scale also regarding PV installations. By the end of 2002, more 
than 200,000 people worked in the Chinese solar thermal industry with a turnover of $ 
1.3 billion. China has also by far the biggest installed solar collector surface, which 
amounted to some 51.4 million m2 (38.8 percent of global capacity) by the end of 2003 
with an annual production capacity of 12 million m2 within the same year, and on top of 
an annual growth rate of 27 percent in installed area between 1998-2002. By the end of 
2004, the total installed solar thermal collector surface had even increased to 65 million 
m2 (Zhang 2005: 5; Li 2005; IEA 2005: 7). 
 
Regarding the Chinese PV market, in 2004, solar modules with a capacity of about 70 
MWp were produced in China, annual production capacity at the end of 2004 amount-
ing to over 100 MW. In the same year, altogether more than 40 enterprises with over 
10,000 employees were involved in the production, distribution and installation of PV 
systems and components (GTZ 2005: 9). 
 
According to the latest market review by SolarPlaza the domestic PV market is still in 
its infancy, but the production and export of solar grade silicon, cells and modules has 
grown by 50-100 percent in 2005. The total available production capacity for cell and 
module production (of the current 30 major companies involved) is already above 20 
percent of the world’s total, coming from less than 1 percent only 5 years ago. Most of 
the production is exported. 
 
Currently, China is the world’s third country in terms of solar cell production capacity 
and is expected to grow to 820 MW per year in 2006, based on the ambitions of the 20 
or more cell manufacturers active in this market. The overall goal of the Chinese gov-
ernment is to have 450 MW cumulative PV power installed in China by 2010, com-
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pared to the estimated current 75 MW in 2005. In order to achieve this, an average sales 
growth of 40 percent per year until 2010 is needed. The ambition has even been set to 
8,000 MW by 2020 for the next decade, where PV could already be cost competitive. 
The main market segment apart from exporting its RES technology in China is rural 
electrification (see below) (SolarPlaza 2006).  
 
Similar to the Chinese solar market development, also the domestic wind market has a 
big growth potential. Whereas the current installed capacity - amounting to 1,260 MW 
by the end of 2005 (GWEC 2006: 2) - is still relatively small, the overall Chinese wind 
energy potential is estimated at 1,000 GW (250 GW onshore and 750 GW offshore). 
According to EWEA/Greenpeace, up to 170 GW of wind power could be installed in 
China by 2020 to generate 417 TWh a year, needing total cumulative investment of 
more than 100 billion Euro. The scenario would create 382,000 jobs and reduce annual 
CO2 emissions by 325.2 megatons (EWEA/Greenpeace 2004: 64 et sqq.). The Chinese 
Government plans to have 30,000 MW available by 2020. 
 
The Chinese Government is fostering the localisation of wind industry by different 
means: Since several years, a high and rising local content quota is asked for in the 
wind concession tenders. In a growing wind market, this provision gives incentives to 
the international manufacturers to set up manufacturing in China or conclude licensing 
agreements with Chinese manufacturers.  
 
Refraining from REFIT reduces the options for foreign developers in China to a mini-
mum. They cannot compete with local developers for low prices, in particular if those 
developers are agents of the electricity generators which are obliged through silent or 
open quota to establish RE capacity. 
 
More than half of the world’s small hydropower capacity exists in China, amounting to 
34 GW, where an ongoing boom in small hydro construction led to nearly 4 GW of new 
capacity in 2004 (REN 21 2005: 7 et sqq.). Furthermore, China in 2004 already used 5 
million m3 of pit gas and announced to increase its use to 20 million m3 by 2020. Fi-
nally, in the biofuels market China also set ambitious goals with a planned usage of 60 
millions tons by 2020 (50 millions tons biodiesel and 10 million tons bioethanol) 
(Zhang 2005: 5 et seq.).  
 
On the one side, all these RES targets comprise a big development potential for the 
Chinese RES industry. On the other side, and strongly related to the ambitious domestic 
targets, a fast growing Chinese RES industry would also produce huge export opportu-
nities for innovative and cost competitive products, taking into account the global 
growth perspectives of RES. In an optimistic scenario published by the German Advi-
sory Council on Global Change (WBGU), RES are expected to reach a share in total 
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world energy supply of more than 52 percent by 2050, and even 86 percent by 2100 
(WBGU 2003: 129 et seq.). 
 
A further important driver – like in Germany – for a strengthened RES support in China 
could be an international commitment to active climate change policy. 
 
China’s CO2 emissions nearly doubled from 2.289 billion tons in 1990 to 4.462 billion 
tons by 2004 (DIW 2005: 565). They are supposed to overtake the USA as the largest 
producer of CO2 emissions by the year 2020. In contrast to the USA, in August 2002 
China ratified the “Kyoto Protocol” as a Non-Annex I country, which means that it has 
not agreed to a binding target to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the first 
commitment period 2008-2012 but has the possibility to be the host for clean energy 
projects under the “Clean Development Mechanism – CDM”). China, as the world's 
second largest energy user, presents a huge potential for CDM projects. Many of such 
projects could be on the basis of renewable energies. 
 
The future of the growth of China’s GHG emissions very much depends on the question 
whether China will accept binding reduction targets of its CO2 emissions in a second 
Kyoto-period after 2012, as well as on its willingness to commit itself to domestic tar-
gets with regard to energy efficiency and RES. If so, China could take a leading role as 
a country with binding GHG reduction targets with an announcement effect for other 
developing countries. At least concerning the latter, China seems to already have taken 
a proactive approach. 
 
In November 2004, China announced an energy conservation plan with the goal to con-
serve about 1.4 billion tons of coal equivalent (tce) and to limit its primary energy con-
sumption by 2020 to about 3 billion tce (WEC 2005: 17). Regarding RES, on occasion 
of the “International Conference for Renewable Energies 2005” in Beijing in November 
2005, a further increase of China’s already ambitious RES goals were announced: by 
2020 China will have installed 30 GW of wind energy (the previous goal was 20 GW), 
20 GW of biomass and 2 GW of solar energy projects. Together with big hydro China 
thereby wants to reach a contribution of RES to its electricity consumption of more than 
30 percent, respectively 15 percent concerning its primary energy consumption. Further 
development goals announced are to increase the total solar thermal collector space 
from 65 million m2 by the end of 2004 to 300 million m2 by 2020, as well as to raise the 
use of biofuels up to 50 million tons annually at the same time (Zhang 2005: 5). 
 
Besides all this, a positive cognitive environment towards RES like in Germany would 
help the Chinese RES development to gain momentum. German campaigns like the 
“Solar Campaign 2000” with its slogan “Solar - of course” which between 1999 and 
2001 successfully promoted solar thermal energy, or the recently started “Information 
Campaign Renewable Energies” from the German RES industry could also be adopted 
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in China to inform the public about the benefits of RES. As China until 1993 was en-
ergy self-sufficient, such campaigns could highlight the contribution of RES to regain 
China’s energy independency as well as to redound to a secure energy supply (Gu 2005: 
2). A strong driver with respect to a favourable attitude towards RES is also supposed to 
come from China’s continued efforts in its rural electrification, where PV systems play 
a major role and directly help to convince the local population from the benefits of RES 
(see below). 
 
Finally, technical drivers will help China to pave the way for a stronger and sustained 
use of RES. Similar to the situation in Germany, but on a much larger scale, the Chinese 
power generation system not only needs to be modernised but also to be increased to 
satisfy the growing energy needs of the most populous country of the world. As the lat-
est available development figures regarding the planned boost of China’s power genera-
tion capacity foresee a doubling between 2005 and 2020 from 450 to 900 GW, the 
strong raise of RES will also be a top priority for the Chinese government. A stronger 
use of RES in the planned amount (112 GW RES capacity, excluding large hydro until 
2020) (Zhang 2005: 5; WEC 2005: 32) will also show positive scale effects and thereby 
will bring RES costs down. 
 
Another technical success condition for the further diffusion of RES in China is the de-
velopment of the power grid. In recent years, formerly existing isolated grids have been 
integrated into regional integrated systems. Massive investments are underway to create 
a single national integrated grid by 2006. Even though 98 percent of the Chinese popu-
lation have access to electricity, still some 30 million people are waiting to be supplied 
with electricity. From the remaining part of the population without power supply, par-
ticularly in the Western and Northern provinces, about 23 million are scheduled to re-
ceive basic supply through the ambitious “National Brightness Programme” by 2010.  
 
In the peripheral areas, renewable energies are an economical alternative to grid supply 
and a more appropriate and environmentally cleaner option than conventional diesel 
stations. The energy needs in the remote areas correlate particularly well with the solar, 
wind, and micro hydropower potential, so that these alternative energy forms seem pre-
destined for electrifying rural areas in China. The high potential in some regions will 
even allow renewable energies to be used for on-grid electricity generation, particularly 
in wind power. 
 
At present, several national development programmes, partly with bilateral and multina-
tional support, are being carried out to improve rural power supply in China. One of the 
world’s most ambitious programmes is the Township Electrification Programme (Song 
Dian Dao Xiang). Financed with about US$ 560 million, almost 20 MW in PV systems 
or hybrid PV wind systems and 274 MW in small hydropower stations have been in-
stalled within only two years by the end of 2004 and connected to mini power grids. 
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While the first programme phase comprised over 1,000 municipalities with approxi-
mately one million inhabitants, a second phase from 2005 to 2010 will include another 
10,000 municipalities (Village Electrification Programme - Song Dian Dao Cun) and 
PV village systems as well as solar home systems with a total capacity of 265 MW. 
Altogether 23 million people will be supplied with power by 2010 (GTZ 2005: 1 et 
sqq.). 
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7. Concluding remarks 
In the previous chapters we have analysed the main drivers for the success of the Ger-
man RES promotion approach like the favourable design of the EEG, a lead-market 
oriented RES promotion policy mix, European and international commitments and ac-
tive climate change policy, a positive cognitive environment of the German population 
towards RES, as well as technical drivers supporting the whole process. We than 
showed that most of these drivers can also be found in the Chinese case, respectively 
should be transferable to the Chinese energy policy framework. 
 
Nevertheless, albeit China shows a strong willingness to widely increase its renewable 
energy use, there are still some constraints to be taken into account. One possible obsta-
cle to fully reach the ambitious RES targets set could be a financial conflict of goals 
with other (alleged) clean energy technologies like nuclear, big hydro or even the so 
called clean coal technology. As the development goal by 2020 for nuclear is 40 GW 
(from 8.7 GW in 2004) and 150 GW for big hydro (from around 75 GW in 2004) (GTZ 
2005: 1; NDRC 2005; WEC 2005: 29 et sqq.), it remains to be seen if all these growth 
targets could be reached at the same time. Furthermore, there still seems to be a weak 
institutional structure. Currently there exists only one RES division within the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The division is also in charge of the 
large hydro program. 
 
Besides this, the nascent domestic RES industry still lacks the weight as political lobby 
within the central government, which seems to be more concerned with the large coal 
and growing oil industry. 
 
The NDRC seems to have as principal goal to build up a Chinese RES industry. The 
influence of the NPC’s Environmental Committee is growing but not strong enough to 
hold the large energy industry in check. Finally, there seems to be a lack of finance for 
the realisation of the ambitious RES targets. Although the recently adopted Chinese 
RES law comprises the constitution of a RES fund, it is still unclear, how its financial 
strength will look like. Also in the future it may remain necessary to attract foreign 
capital to help to fulfil China’s RES goals. A strong signal could have been clear and 
ambitious feed-in tariffs within the new Chinese RES law. As now a tendering scheme 
was preferred, which in other countries like the UK or Ireland haven’t shown the 
wished results, it remains to be seen, whether renewable energies in China will have the 
same success as in Germany. 
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